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ABSTRACT – What is the essence of politics? How does one draw the 
line between politics and the political? How anti-political properties are 
said to be opposed to a supposedly political nature of human beings? 
The article offers original reflections and insights into the actuality of 
the history of political thought.
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RESUMO – Qual é a essência da política? Como devemos diferenciar 
entre a política e o político? Como propriedades anti-políticas podem 
ser concebidas em oposição a uma natureza supostamente política dos 
seres humanos? O artigo oferece reflexões originais e instigantes sobre 
a atualidade da história do pensamento político.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Anti-político. Governo. O político. Política. Teoria polí- 
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Although Aristotle’s definition of man as a “political animal” has been 
repeated again and again during the two and a half millennia since the 
demise of Athenian democracy, most of us most of the time are quite 
happy to let others take responsibility for governing while we get on 
with our everyday lives. We may have opinions on how the government 
should govern, and we may have certain expectations about the kind 
of persons to whom we trust this responsibility. But these are personal, 
subjective, and private, expressed publicly (if at all) only on election day. 
when we more often than not vote against the other candidate rather than 
for our own. Politics has become a profession much like any other, with 
its specialized training, criteria of excellence and consumers to satisfy. 
Those of us who follow the goings-on among the political class of society 
tend to judge its practitioners in the same way that we evaluate the 
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professional athletes or entertainers competing for popular admiration. 
We are aesthetes, concerned first and foremost with what interests us 
and only then with what affects our interests.
Perhaps the ancients were political animals; we moderns seem to 
have become anti-political beings. Yet, like them, we call our political 
institutions “democratic” and are proud of our democratic way of life. 
The fact that we criticize our politicians for poll-guided responses to 
problems, as if personal moral “character” is a better guide than the 
popular will, suggests that we doubt the wisdom of the people whose 
sovereignty we ritually affirm. Whether this passage from ancient political 
to modern anti-political democracy represents progress is questionable. 
But the clock cannot be turned backward; anti-politics has become the 
modern replacement for politics. Its implications need to be analyzed 
and the historical process by which it emerged need to be evaluated. 
The term itself suggests that anti-politics is nonetheless a kind of 
politics.
After the Fall of the Wall in 1989, followed by the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, democracy seemed to be the only legitimate form of 
politics. Yet, nearly two decades later, doubt and skepticism have replaced 
optimism that accompanied the unexpected dissolution of the Cold War. 
“Democracy” was victorious, by default. In the former communist bloc, 
every step forward has been accompanied by two steps backward, as 
nationalism serves to compensate for the loss of the low-level but real 
economic security of the old order. Free elections there, as elsewhere, 
are now fruitful terrain for populist demagogs peddling nostalgia while 
blaming the West (meaning the United States, if not its “Jewish Lobby”) 
for their difficulties. As in the 20th century, when democracy gained its 
authority by contrast to its anti-political enemies (fascism, communism 
as well as unrestrained capitalism), in our 21st century it shines only with 
a light reflected by new forms of anti-politics (fundamentalism, terrorism 
and economic globalization). The supporters of democracy have come to 
value it more for what it is not than for the vision of a shared future that it 
offers. But if its attractiveness has come to depend only on the negation 
of its anti-political enemies, democracy could well disappear in our new 
century. It is careless today to herald democracy’s uncontested triumph. 
It would not be the first universally admired political system to disappear 
because its realization was taken for granted.
The messianic hopes with which George W. Bush led America into 
a futile, frustrating, and in every sense of the word costly adventure in 
the Middle East have been dashed. Mr. Bush may still believe, as he 
declared in his second inaugural speech, with “complete confidence in 
the eventual triumph of freedom… because freedom is the permanent D. Howard – The actuality of the history of political thought
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hope of mankind, the hunger in dark places, the longing of the soul”. But 
that faith is only the rhetorical expression of an anti-political democracy; 
it is metaphysics, or theology, rather than political thought. It does not 
follow, however, that America, and the world, would have been a better 
place if the Middle East had been left to fester under the despotic rule of 
self-perpetuating elites. The problem is that democracy is not a simple 
institutional arrangement, like the elections in the former Soviet bloc, 
that can be imported, let alone imposed on a nation. The American 
expectation that, once the old order was overthrown, the people would 
begin to govern themselves freely, is another illustration of the anti-
political assumptions that have come to dominate political thought 
in that country. Nonetheless, popular support for the invasion of Iraq 
– insofar as it was not simply an emotional reaction to September 11 
2001, or to the false claims about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction – 
illustrates the fact that anti-politics is still a politics. Its specificity arises 
from the fact that its goal is the elimination of politics (which will be 
unnecessary after “the eventual triumph of freedom” heralds an earthly 
paradise). As such, anti-politics is a self-contradictory project, condemned 
to failure. 
Anti-politics criticizes, and may attempt to overthrow, really existing 
democracy on the ground that it is the true realization of democracy. It 
claims that its success will insure the reign of peace and harmony; its 
political battles are a war to end all wars. In the 20th century, anti-politics 
appeared in the phenomena of fascism, communism and unrestrained 
capitalism. As with the misguided war in Iraq, these movements must 
not be caricatured; the motives of their members could be well-intended. 
Fascism challenged the merely formal, divisive and weak-willed new 
democracies that emerged from the carnage of the first World War in 
the name of the will of a pure and united nation. In the place of the self-
alienated individualism of bourgeois society, the fascists proposed to 
restore a pre-existing substratum of national homogeneity and ethnic 
destiny. Communism, for its part, denounced the exploitation of the 
working class that was hidden beneath the formal democratic equality of 
rights; the proletarian revolution would overcome class division, ushering 
in a unified society, replacing the anarchy of competitive capitalism 
by rational planning. As for pure capitalism, its political defenders 
criticized the short-term vision of those who used their democratically 
guaranteed vote and voice in support of government intervention 
into the workings of the free market, which is the only guarantor of 
true individual liberty. A truly free market capitalism, they argue, will 
create leisure time and cultural riches for all because citizens recognize 
the fact that the collective wisdom of the market is greater than the D. Howard – The actuality of the history of political thought
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knowledge of any single, private individual. In this capitalist anti-political 
utopia, economics replaces politics, insuring private satisfactions that 
compensate for the loss of political participation, which was no longer 
necessary.
Each of these 20th century movements was undeniably political. The 
faults of the newly democratic societies that they criticized were often 
real. In particular, they were reacting to the divisions introduced by 
the multitude of particular interests that gained equal voice in the new 
democratic institutions. They objected to the egoistic individualism that 
they claimed was unleashed by democracy; they denounced its secular 
civilization for promoting a relativism that left no room for universal 
values; and they blamed it for the domination of opinion over truth, 
emotion over science, and competition over community. But the remedies 
they prescribed would have eliminated the possibility of political action 
since a homogeneous nation, or a completely planned proletarian society, 
or a thoroughly market-regulated economy would have no need to seek 
popular legitimation for its decisions, no reason to deliberate before 
pronouncing judgement, and no means by which its rules and regulations 
could be contested or modified. In this sense, each was an anti-political 
politics. When fascism or communism did seize power, it became clear 
that this source of its strength is also the root of its weakness: because 
its unitary goals led it to over-reach, taking responsibility for the entirety 
of social and even personal relations, it was powerless in the face of the 
unexpected; responsible for everything, there was nothing to which it 
could appeal for support. Although each had external enemies, the regime 
collapsed under its own weight, undermined by the very monopoly that it 
had maintained. By comparison, it was the failure of capitalism to realize 
its anti-political goals that explains its continued existence. For the same 
reason, capitalism and democracy are often seen to be two, inseparable, 
sides of the same coin. 
The early years of the 21st century have witnessed the emergence 
of new forms of anti-politics in the forms of fundamentalism, terrorism 
and the critique of globalization. As with their 20th century ancestors, 
each justifies itself as both a critique of and a remedy for the immanent 
failings of democracy. However, what makes these new forms of anti-
politics different is that they are a response to the anti-political nature of 
the established Western democracies that, as in the case of George W. 
Bush, are incapable of reflecting on the implications of their own political 
projects. These anti-political democracies are unable to recognize that 
religious fundamentalism might be a legitimate attempt to reassert 
human dignity in the face of the moral relativism produced by a privatized 
individualism that can find no grounds to condemn sexual license and D. Howard – The actuality of the history of political thought
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rampant consumerist hedonism. Complacent democrats fail to ask 
themselves whether terrorism might be a reply to their own moralizing 
political culture that refuses to recognize any values foreign to its own; 
they justify their anti-politics as a legitimate response on the part of a 
minority to the uncomprehending pressure of an oppressive civilization 
that refuses to recognize the right to be different. Similarly, self-sure 
democrats do not see that an economic world without borders in which 
cash-value has become the only value is not the inevitable result of 
the freedom that they identify with private liberty. What they praise 
as globalization appears to others as the expression of an economic 
imperialism. But, tout comprendre n’est pas tout pardoner: 21st century 
anti-politics is no more acceptable than was its predecessor. Indeed, it is 
more dangerous insofar as it is a reaction to an anti-political democracy 
that is not capable of putting itself, and its values, into question. It was 
this ability, whose basis was not its economic productivity but its roots 
in the soil of the Western democratic tradition, that explains the survival 
of 20th century democratic capitalism.
If democracy is to survive the continued assaults of the new anti-
politics of the 21st century, it will have to rediscover its own historical 
foundations. If it remains a form of anti-politics, it might well imitate its 
20th century predecessors, collapsing from within rather than from the 
force of its anti-political enemies. The foundation for this reconsideration 
of the nature of modern democracy was present already in the challenge 
of 20th century anti-politics; it has been renewed by the new threats 
of our new century. The anti-political temptation that privileges the 
values of unity over diversity, rationality over opinion, universality over 
particularity, community over competition, the sacred over the secular, 
stability over innovation and tradition over novelty has to be understood 
as a internal challenge rather than an external threat. Because these 
anti-political values are immanent, they are a warning against the 
complacency of anti-political democrats who think that democracy 
can be achieved once-and-for-all, forgetting that there is no democracy 
without democrats. The challenge posed by anti-politics prevents the 
self-satisfied illusion that democratic political decisions are, or ought 
to be, identical with the will of society, reminding the citizen that there 
must always exist a tension between the two equally important levels 
on which individuals in a democracy live their lives. Democratic political 
power is legitimate only when it can be, and is, contested by the society 
that it claims to govern. The travails of modern democracy in the face 
of the ever-renewed anti-political temptation reveal the more general 
structure of politics, whose history in turn casts light on the possibilities 
for democratic renewal in the 21st century. D. Howard – The actuality of the history of political thought
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I have been talking about politics without defining the term because 
at one level we all know what it means. But if anti-politics is itself a 
form of politics, as the examples given above suggest, “politics” cannot 
be understood simply as the action of governments or those seeking to 
control them (since anti-politics seeks to overthrow the existing regime). 
To identify politics with the activity of politicians in their competition 
for power would be tautological. At the other extreme, it would be a 
crude simplification to reduce politics to Lenin’s famous definition kto 
kogo (“who whom,” i.e., who does what to whom). Power is certainly 
involved in politics; but power is not identical with force, which is 
imposed on citizens without their consent. This distinction suggests that 
power should be defined as legitimate force. It is a type of authority to 
which members of a society implicitly or explicitly consent. The source 
of legitimate power or authority will differ in different societies; it may 
be secular or sacred, rational or customary, institutional or charismatic; 
its basis may be strength, knowledge, or wealth, each of which will in 
turn be defined differently in different historical contexts. It follows that 
“politics” is the creation of the meaningful discourse and shared values 
through which force acquires legitimate authority. The history of political 
thought is the story of the search for legitimacy and the clash among the 
forms of legitimacy. 
This conception of politics does not neglect the material stakes at issue 
in the quest for power; but it avoids the skeptical reduction of politics to 
competing interests. The material interests that seek satisfaction in the 
political arena can be understood as practicing a kind of anti-politics that 
challenges the established order. For example, in the case of 20th century 
capitalism, the reality of exploitation and domination that were hidden 
and ignored by the identification of freedom with free markets produced 
a social movement for change. Supporters of the existing political order 
saw its claims as anti-political, calling them “socialist.” But the result of 
its pressure was the welfare-state measures adopted by the New Deal, 
which prevented democratic capitalist society from adopting the anti-
political form of a pure market economy. Market capitalist anti-politics 
was kept in its proper place; its critical function within a democratic 
society was recognized, since markets do play a regulating role in a 
democratic society. The danger is that they become an external challenge 
to democracy itself. This balance between politics and anti-politics was 
in part the result of a battle of ideas; but the material conditions that 
created a powerful social movement, as well as the political genius of 
Franklin Roosevelt, cannot be neglected. While a deeper analysis of 
this uniquely American history is beyond the scope of this essay, it will 
be necessary here to refer often to the hard realities of history in order D. Howard – The actuality of the history of political thought
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to understand the development of the political thought that is being 
analyzed here.1
If politics and anti-politics both compete with one another, supplement 
each other, and are sometimes transformed into their opposite, this is 
due to the fact that both of them are attempts to establish legitimate 
political authority. Politics exists in every society; without it, men and 
women who co-exist in a given space and time would be no different than 
a queue of passengers waiting for a bus, or consumers bustling around 
a shopping mall searching for the best bargains. Just as the members of 
an athletic team are joined together by a common goal or “team spirit” 
that transcends their particular and private concerns while giving to 
each a new and shared identity, so too are the citizens of a society joined 
together by a shared framework of meaning and values that unites them 
in spite of their private differences. People may belong to many social 
organizations, each of which is defined by the goals that it seeks. Political 
organization is the highest of these institutions because it organizes 
the relations among all the other, less inclusive groups, establishing 
a hierarchy of values that can always, in principle, be challenged and 
changed if it loses its ability to unify (becoming an anti-politics) or if 
the excluded come to recognize their own force (as anti-political) and 
transform the previous value-system.2
The shared framework of meaning and values that unites the members 
of a society can be defined as “the political.” This general term is not 
as abstract as it may appear. The political delineates the lines between 
the licit and the illicit, the just and the unjust, the knowable and the 
unknown. It defines the grammar and the syntax that govern the social 
interactions among members of a given society. Just as there are some 
things that cannot be said, some expressions that cannot be understood, 
and even some sounds that cannot become words, so too in any society   
 
1  Historical illustrations of this dynamic by which anti-politics that represents 
excluded material interests challenges a politics that has itself frozen into an 
anti-politics will recur frequently in this book. The first of these is offered in Plato’s 
Republic when the Sophist, Thrasymachus, argues that justice is simply that which 
serves the interest of the strong. To be sure, Plato disagrees, as will be seen; but 
the fact that he finds it necessary to integrate the argument of the Sophist points 
to the fact that that anti-politics has a legitimate and necessary task: it challenges 
the gap between the claims of the established forms of authority and the real social 
relations that they serve to legitimate. 
2  The fiercely capitalist British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, famously replied 
to the critics who insisted that she take into account the good of society that “there 
is no such thing as society; there are only individual men and women and there 
are families.” In a sense, she was right; “society” is not something that exists in 
a state of nature, without human intervention. It is politics that makes society – or 
in Mrs. Thatcher’s case: anti-politics.D. Howard – The actuality of the history of political thought
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there are things that cannot be done, actions in which no one will join, 
and projects that no one could imagine. If the symbolic universe of a 
given people is defined by its religious beliefs, this will produce types of 
behavior that – to the outside observer – are incomprehensible, foolhardy, 
or irrational; but for the same reason, the believers will be incapable of 
understanding the “anti-religious” objections of the critical observer. The 
dialogue of the deaf cannot perdure indefinitely if the religious and the 
secular are to inhabit a common political world. 
An well-known example that changed the course of political history 
can be introduced briefly to concretize the way in which the political 
provides a framework within which politics and anti-politics compete. For 
long centuries of Western history, the political was defined by religious 
belief. That same belief became an anti-political force instituting a new 
definition of the political when the Protestant Reformation challenged the 
Catholic emphasis on external forms of worship. The Protestants denied 
that the Catholic sacramental practices were the proper realization of the 
divine will; but the subjective faith and inscrutable divine grace on which 
their new religion was based prepared the way for a secular individualism 
which would become the new defining principle of political life. An 
anti-politics became the basis for a new but still religiously founded 
politics, only to be confronted in turn by a new, secular anti-politics that 
established finally the basis of our modern individualist political culture. 
The fact that the anti-political challenge develops within the existing 
political forms – Protestantism is still based in Christianity, secular 
individualism builds from the Protestant stress on the direct relation of the 
believer to his God – points to a structure that is repeated constantly in 
political history. The reason for this lies in the fact that while the political 
defines the type of politics that can undertaken in a given society – in 
this case a religiously based action – politics is also a constant attempt 
to define the political. It may conserve the existing understanding of the 
political but it may also, and perhaps unintentionally, inaugurate a new 
vision, as did the Reformation.3
The unique role of the political can be illustrated by comparing a 
philosophical understanding of the political with the type of analysis   
 
3  There is a further dimension of the political that needs to be clarified. It was 
suggested already by the idea that religion could be a form of the political. The 
political is not identical with politics as it is practiced in our modern societies, 
or as it is defined by political science, where political life is distinguished from 
other facets of social life by its governmental function. Political power need not be 
exercised by means of recognizably political institutions. Women were not wrong 
to denounce the patriarchy, socialists to refuse the dictatorship of capital, nor 
rationalists to criticize an unholy coalition of church and state.D. Howard – The actuality of the history of political thought
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offered by political science. The scientist looks at his object of study 
from outside, as if he were using a telescope or a microscope to study 
something that is unaffected by his regard. Differences among individuals 
and groups exist in every society; some of these qualities are natural, 
others are cultural. Differences of economic wealth, social status, political 
power can be described; ethnicity, gender, religion or education are then 
charted and correlated. In the case of politics, the difficulty is to determine 
which of these differences makes a difference from the standpoint of 
the participants. Which one could lead a person to complain about 
the injustice of her lot and expect others to understand and act on the 
grievance? Why are some social differences considered licit? When are the 
forms of inequality treated as the accidental result of unknowable factors? 
This is where the philosophical reflection on the nature of the political 
becomes important, since it defines the licit, the just and the knowable, 
as well as their opposites. It establishes the shared background against 
which differences become salient. The idea that the strongest, or the 
richest, or the most virtuous – or the people as a whole – should rule 
reflects a political choice which creates the shared background. Similarly, 
the unthinking application of the economic theory of “rational choice” 
to all aspects of behavior in contemporary society is itself a political 
decision about how to understand and organize the social and private 
worlds of the citizenry. This political dimension is hidden by the scientific 
illusion that a neutral observer is merely defining the facts as they exist. 
By underlining the dimension of choice that is involved, the philosopher 
makes clear that “the political” is not imposed on a society from above 
or beyond its boundaries. 
At this point, the basic problem of all politics can be defined. The 
political is distinct from the society that it structures; and yet its 
legitimacy, which distinguishes power from force, depends on its being 
perceived by the members of the society as the expression of their own 
will. That is why consent is fundamental to politics. But how can the 
participants consent to be governed by a power that is distinct from them 
and external to their own will? This is the point at which the theoretical 
distinction of politics and anti-politics acquires its practical importance. 
Politics accepts the difference between the two levels; it realizes that it 
can only exist because the political is distinct from other types of social 
relations. But it recognizes also the need for politics to earn the consent 
of the members of the society it governs. Politics can accept diversity, 
plurality and particularity because it is aware that it is different from these 
relations. Anti-politics reacts to the need for the consent of the governed 
by seeking to create relations of homogeneity, unity and universality 
among the members. In doing so, anti-politics correctly recognizes that a D. Howard – The actuality of the history of political thought
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society founded on difference cannot long exist as a society; in this way, 
anti-politics serves again as a complement and corrective to politics. 
The danger, however, is that anti-politics goes further, eliminating the 
autonomy of the political by claiming that it has (or will, should, or can) 
overcome the constitutive difference that made politics possible. Such 
a realization of politics would return humanity to a pre-political state of 
nature that would have no need for politics. It would be literally anarchic: 
an arche, without rule.
The challenge of politics is to preserve the distinction between 
the political and the society that it institutes while at the same time 
avoiding the complete separation of the two poles, which would also 
introduce a form of anti-politics. This is necessary because the complete 
subordination of society to the political values that make it what it is 
would destroy the possibility of free consent by the members while ruling 
out any possible change that might be advisable in the face of newly 
recognized conditions. On the other hand, the complete subordination 
of the political to the actually existing social relations would freeze the 
imagination of the members, blinding them to the need to recognize the 
new and to face up to its challenge. But some subordination must exist 
if the difference between the two spheres is not to become absolute; the 
gap cannot become a chasm, the distinction an opposition, the relation a 
separation. How can difference be maintained while unity is preserved? 
How do the many become one without abandoning their diversity? How 
can the freedom of the individual be protected while the equality of 
membership is maintained? 
These theoretical questions return us to the problems of democratic 
politics. Democracy is a form of rule (kratos) by the people (demos). It 
appears at first that this rule by the people over itself eliminates the 
constitutive difference between the political and the social. Self-rule 
implies autonomy, which comes from the Greek terms autos (self) and 
nomos (law). But laws govern the relations among those subject to them; 
the concept of ruling remains4. The difference of the people governing 
themselves and the people as governed (by themselves) is not eliminated 
in a democracy. The citizen as elector or juror is acting as a ruler making 
decisions that will apply to him and his fellows as, for example, an 
economic actor, the participant in a lawsuit, or a family member. What 
is more, it is the majority that rules in a democracy, leaving the minority 
unsatisfied by its decisions. But, it is important to remember that in 
a functioning democracy, the minority does not refuse to accept the   
 
4  This is clear when it is recalled that the Greeks distinguished between the laws 
of nature (physis) and a conventional or human law (nomos).D. Howard – The actuality of the history of political thought
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verdict of its peers; instead, it sets about organizing itself in order to 
become in turn the majority.5 The reason for this acceptance is that all 
of the participants accept the political framework that makes possible 
democratic politics. The shared conception of the political explains why 
citizens accept the authority of the elected rulers of the moment as long 
as their power depends on the consent of the governed.
This fundamental principle of democracy is not self-evident. One of 
the lessons taught by the study of the history of political thought is that 
the source of the legitimation that distinguishes power and authority 
from sheer force has always been outside and external to the members 
of society, in the form of gods or God, nature or natural law, tradition 
or reason. Democracy’s uniqueness lies in the fact that the source of 
legitimacy is immanent to politics. The result is paradoxical: the consent 
of the governed and the elimination of the constitutive distinction of the 
political from the social seem to go together. The non-democratic forms 
that predominate in the history of political thought apparently preserve 
the difference between the two levels, whose relation they at the same 
time maintain. God remains divine even while the secular world is 
affected by the sacred presence; natural law is nowhere fully realized in 
the existing world which nonetheless strives to conform to it; and reason 
remains an ideal that is sought even though human finitude makes its 
realization impossible. It is this difference that makes possible a kind of 
criticism of the existing realization of the political that does not put its 
basic structure into question. Political reform becomes possible in this 
manner. But the reformers may meet unexpected resistance; to overcome 
it, they must first understand and interpret it; and in so doing, they begin 
to alter their vision of the shared concept of the political. That is how the 
movement for reform of the Catholic church became the Reformation.
The case of democracy is complicated by the fact that the immanence 
of the democratic principle of consent means that the principle of the 
political and the actual practice by which decisions are made are not 
distinct but rather are identified. This has potentially anti-political 
consequences insofar as the formal principle of consent is treated as the 
real imperative that every member of the society truly and actual give her 
consent at every moment to every decision while participating fully and 
completely in the political life of society. The result would be the kind of   
 
5  It may refuse, arguing that the democratic institutions have been perverted, 
that the decision reflected a merely formal equality of participation that was 
overshadowed by the great wealth, or control of the means of communication, or 
the abuse of governmental power. In this case, it would denounce the merely formal 
democracy and seek to create a real or realized democracy. But the danger here is 
that a legitimate criticism of abuses of democracy becomes an anti-politics.D. Howard – The actuality of the history of political thought
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anti-politics that threatened the new democracies of the 20th century. The 
strength of democracy that comes from the immanence of its foundational 
principle becomes the source of its potential weakness. If the citizen 
must be consulted on each and every decision concerning all aspects of 
societal life, the result would not only be chaos and confusion; it would 
mean also the destruction of political life, which can be maintained 
only insofar as its autonomy is insured. As Rousseau said famously, 
a true democracy would be possible only for a society of angels. And, 
he added elsewhere, if men were angels, there would be no need for 
government. A perfectly just society would have no room for and no need of 
politics.
The paradoxical potentiality of democracy to take an anti-political 
turn reveals in turn the potentiality of all forms of political society to 
adopt anti-political means of action. After all, the democratic form of anti-
politics leads to the positive demand that the merely formal principle of 
consent be given real force. That is why democracy is the generic form 
of politics. The apparent separation of the sources of social legitimacy 
in non-democratic societies can come to be felt as a real alienation from 
the grounds of meaningful social relations. Attempts are then made 
to transcend the difference, overcoming the distance, realizing the 
governing principle of social relations. The anti-politics that then emerges 
is more difficult to recognize because it does not adopt a form that is 
easily seen as political. The example of the Protestant Reformation can 
again be used as an illustration. Luther’s principles of sola fides and sola 
scriptura rejected the Catholic understanding of the sacramental role of 
the church because it concentrated only on the external practice of the 
faith. Luther’s intention was not political; but the resulting redefinition 
of the political was seized upon by pious peasants who took the reformer 
at his word and sought to live according to the Word, unleashing a 
rebellion that was suppressed in blood. The positive implication of this 
anti-political aspect of the Reformation was that Luther recognized the 
need to create an autonomous Protestant church with its defined doctrine 
and practices.
The unity of the history of political thought is suggested by this 
interplay of the political, politics and anti-politics. The political can take 
many forms; looked at with a telescope, it can change with surprising 
rapidity; seen with a microscope, it is in constant movement. It is tempting 
to try to describe the process by applying the notion of a “paradigm” 
that Thomas Kuhn applied brilliantly in his massively influential study of 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1966). What Kuhn calls “normal 
science” works in terms of an established paradigm that sets out the 
assumptions of the disciplines and the parameters for research. As the D. Howard – The actuality of the history of political thought
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scientists continue to probe the implications of the paradigm of normal 
science, the encounter abnormalities, results that don’t fit with the 
expectations or that positively contradict them. At first, researchers 
will invent additional hypotheses in order to adapt the abnormalities to 
the existing paradigm. But exceptions will continue to be discovered, 
unease will pervade the community of investigators, until someone 
proposes a new paradigm that, swiftly, as if everyone were waiting for 
the new theory that reorganizes the field, establishes itself as the new 
basis of normal science. This vision of historical change is suggestive, 
but only from the point of view of science. As was seen earlier, political 
thought has to take into account not only the historical facts that fall 
to its purview but also the way in which these facts are experienced 
by the participants in the political world. That is why the anti-political 
temptation has no analogue in the history of science, whereas its role in 
political thought is fundamental, and cannot be reduced to the emergence 
of a mere anomaly.
The political defines the framework within which legitimate politics 
in a given society can be carried out. But it is necessary to warn against 
oversimplification; “the” political cannot be reduced to one single, 
simple and singular principle; life is not so neat and tidy. What counts 
as “legitimate politics” need not have a form that would be recognized 
by a political scientist. Politics is the way in which the members of a 
society regulate their relations to one another (a process that includes 
understanding their debt to their ancestors as well as their responsibility 
to future generations). Religion is obviously a candidate for the definition 
of the political and the framework governing legitimate political action; 
but there are many others, beginning with the Greek quest to forge 
philosophical truth against a background of chaos, continuing in the 
Roman vision of a republic founded on the co-existence of manly virtue 
and legal equality, which was renewed by Machiavelli. And the definition 
of the political need not concern only the public sphere; legitimate 
relations among citizens can be determined by shared private self-
understanding, as in the Hellenistic philosophies such as Stoicism that 
emerged after the demise of Athenian democracy, or in the early Christian 
religion of personal, charitable love, which reappears regularly within the 
institutional framework of the Roman Church. With the onset of modernity 
with its principle of individuality and its stress on the experience of the 
subject, the picture is complicated still further. The point to be made here 
at the outset of our study is that “the political” is constantly enriched and 
overlaid with strata of meaning; and yet, the simple schema defined at 
the outset remains valid, however thickly woven the web of signification. 
The challenge is always to define the political.D. Howard – The actuality of the history of political thought
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Because of the difference between politics and the political, there 
will be always present the need for anti-politics to prevent both the 
abusive unification of the political principle and its realization and their 
radical separation. As with the definition of the political, forms of anti-
politics can overlap; what was a legitimate form of politics can become 
an anti-politics when the definition of the political changes. The Greek 
Sophists who were the allies of Pericles at the time of Athens’ glory are 
the butt of Plato’s critique; the legalism of republican Rome provided an 
instrument for rule over the vast empire that it acquired; and the simple 
humanity of Christianity became not only an institutional Church but 
the source of legitimacy for the Holy Roman Empire. Privatized forms 
of anti-politics emerged as well, first with the Stoic withdrawal, then 
with the monastic forms of Christianity, and forward to the humanism 
of the Renaissance. None of these moments, or the others that will be 
encountered, was fated to remain as a simple movement of opposition to 
the established definition of politics. They might appear as the rejection 
of the existent order; but as anti-politics their political significance cannot 
be ignored. Indeed, the appearance of forms of anti-politics is a sign that 
the prevailing sense of the political is losing its grip; the tension between 
the political and the society whose relations it regulates is weakened, the 
separation may have grown too great, or a process of fusion has begun 
– or, indeed, the two processes can be occurring at one and the same 
time, separation encouraging a demand for fusion, fusion calling forth a 
new type of distinction. And, as was seen in the case of the 20th century 
forms of anti-politics, different forms of the reaction to the weakening of 
the political can coexist.
I began this series of reflections by pointing out that 20th century 
democracy is threatened by anti-politics, whose nature I tried to illustrate 
with contemporary examples. I have now outlined the broad theoretical 
structure that explains that anti-politics is not an aberration but rather an 
essential component of the way in which politics works and has always 
worked. It was precisely the analysis of democracy that showed why 
anti-politics remains a permanent feature of all political societies – and 
why all societies are political, even when their political nature remains 
implicit. The renewal of democracy in the 21st century has to build 
from this structure. It cannot simply rebuild on the basis of the older 
models; times have changed, conditions are different, the challenge is 
to recognize the new for what it is, rather than to let it sink back into the 
familiar patterns. 21st century democracy will share some features with 
20th century democracy, just as the latter built on ideas and practices 
developed in Athens, Rome and Florence. But of course the new cannot D. Howard – The actuality of the history of political thought
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be predicted on the basis of history. What history does teach, however, 
is what must be avoided in order to make possible the recognition of the 
new when it presents itself.
The reason to study the history of political thought is not to look for 
models, be they positive or negative. Rather, over the broad sweep of 
history, certain structural features come to be identified even while their 
actualization differs as conditions vary and times change. Once it is 
seen that democracy represents the generic form of politics, it becomes 
possible to recognize its features in the various political species that 
have been invented by human societies. This is not to say that there is a 
democratic “spirit” that is always present in political history, awaiting 
only the kiss of its philosophical Prince Charming to awaken from its 
dogmatic slumber. But there is always present a vision of the political, 
which does need to be revived if the interplay of politics and anti-politics 
is not to result in a mutual negation of the one by the other. That is 
what needs to be rekindled in our new century if we are to renew our 
democracies. Defining the political today means also renewing it.